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Abstract
The need to pay subjects to participate in experiments places a major financial burden on
experimental economists. In this paper, we conduct dictator games and find that there is no
difference in the way student subjects split money and extra-credit points, an encouraging
result that suggests that giving course points could be a viable alternative to giving out cash
in economic experiments.
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Rewarding experimental subjects with cash in order to study their actions in 
controlled situations  has long been a tradition in experimental economics (Smith 1976).  
However, the need to pay subjects to participate in experiments places a major financial 
burden on researchers, often limiting sample sizes and sometimes even eliminating entire 
projects for want of an adequate research budget.  In this short paper, we explore whether 
an alternative way of rewarding subjects produces similar results in an experimental 
game setting, and find that subjects treat extra-credit points for a course grade similar to 
monetary incentives, a result which suggests that giving course points could be a viable 
alternative to giving out cash in certain experimental situations. 
 
Much research has been conducted on the effect of financial incentives on 
performance in experimental tasks, and Camerer and Hogarth (1999) provide an excellent 
review of that literature.  Our focus in this paper is not on the effect of monetary 
incentives per se, but on evaluating whether subjects’ response to earning class points is 
similar to earning cash.   
 
Brown Kruse and Thompson (2001) compared the use of class points with 
monetary rewards and found that  subjects responded differently to the two reward 
mediums.  Their study was designed to elicit the value of a risk mitigation measure in a 
low-probability high-consequence scenario.  By contrast, in our study using the 
experimental dictator game, we found that student subjects treated class points no 
differently from cash payouts, with the average amount of money they decided to keep 
for themselves being statistically no different from the average number of points they 
kept for themselves.  This finding is encouraging since it suggests that at least in the case 
of simple experimental games, it may be possible to alleviate the financial burden of 
conducting research studies through the use of grade point incentives.  
 
 
2.  Method 
 
The study was conducted amongst students enrolled in a required course at a 
major research university in the United States.  The exercise was conducted at the 
beginning of the semester in order to maintain the same high salience for class points for 
all students
1.   Students participated in the exercise in class as part of the usual class 
routine at the beginning of the class session.  The instructor was assisted by a research 
assistant who distributed and collected the data collection instruments from the subjects 
and disbursed the cash payments at the end of the experiment.  The entire exercise took 
about 20 minutes to complete.   
 
                                                 
1 If this study had been conducted at the end of the semester, extra-credit points would have been non-
salient for some students such as the ones already earning a high A in the course. 
 
  1Subjects played the well-known “dictator game” twice; once with money and 
once with extra-credit points that counted towards their course grade
2.  Since the order in 
which they played the two dictator games can have an impact on their decisions, the order 
of play was randomized amongst the subjects.  About half the subjects first played the 
dictator game in which they had to split 10 extra-credit points
3, and then played the game 
in which they had to split $10; the rest of the subjects played first with money and then 
with points. 
 
We chose the dictator game for its simplicity.  We wanted a game that was easy 
for subjects to understand since these were naive subjects and this would be the students’ 
first exposure to playing economics games.  Also, since subjects’ decisions are not 
predicated on an opponent’s decisions, the dictator game is ideally suited for comparing 
the direct effect of two alternative incentive schemes.  By using the dictator game, we 
were able to implicitly establish a comparative equivalence between the money (10 
dollars) and the points (10 extra-credit points) that each student had to split in the two 
games (s)he played.  
 
The instruction sheet made it clear to the subjects that they would be splitting the 
money (or the points) with another student just like them.  A single-blind payoff protocol 
was used, i.e. students participating in the exercise would never learn the decisions made 
by any specific subject.  The specific decisions made by each student were thus private 
information, known only to the experimenters.  For both dictator games, subjects 
completed a short quiz meant to gauge understanding of the game and its instructions 
before starting the actual game.  We made it a point to “flash the money” in front of the 
students before the start of the exercise in order to make the monetary reward salient, and 





The basic question we would like to answer is – do subjects exhibit the same 
decision pattern when they split points as compared to when they split money in an 
experimental game?  If there is no difference, it would suggest that giving extra-credit 
                                                 
2 The dictator game was developed as a modification of the ultimatum game (Davis and Holt 1993) and 
involves a subject deciding on a voluntary contribution to a second subject.  In the ultimatum game, the 
second subject has ultimatum power and can either accept of reject the division proposed, with zero payoffs 
to both subjects if s/he rejects the division.  In the dictator game, the first subject has the dictator power to 
unilaterally decide on the split; the second subject does not get to accept or reject the offer as in the 
ultimatum game.  The simplicity of the dictator game makes it an attractive one to use.  As in the standard 
dictator game, subjects in our study were told that they had received $10 (or 10 extra-credit points).  They 
could choose to keep all the money for themselves, or could decide to give a portion of it to their unknown 
co-player. Complete instructions that were used are available from the authors on request.    
 
3 The grades for the course were assigned on a curve.  However, the grading included a provision for extra-
credit points that would be added to a student’s grade after the curving.  The points earned in the exercise 
were thus truly points for extra credit. 
 
  2points in a course may be a viable alternative to giving monetary rewards while 
conducting simple economic experiments. 
 
Before we discuss the findings from the study, we would like to briefly dwell on 
statistical power (see Cohen 1988 for a comprehensive treatment of the topic) and its 
implications for the sample size in this study.  When designing this study, we wanted to  
ensure that we had a sample size that gave us adequate statistical power since the nature 
of the study meant that failing to reject the null hypothesis of no significant difference 
was the desirable outcome.  Statistical power, which is defined as the probability that a 
false null hypothesis will be correctly rejected, therefore needed to be high.  Consulting 
Cohen’s power tables for the hypothesis test that we would conduct, and assuming a 
“medium” effect size (Cohen’s d=0.5) told us that a sample size of 50 would provide 
adequately high power of 0.93.  The actual number of students participating in the study 
was 47; using Bissonnette’s (2000) power calculator, the power for this study for a two-
tailed paired-comparison t test at α=0.05 is an adequate 0.918. 
 
The overall findings are shown in Table I.  Recall that we had randomly assigned 
subjects to two different “order” conditions since the order in which they played could 
possibly have an effect on their decisions.  Approximately half the subjects first decided 
on the amount of money they would like to keep for themselves and then decided on the 
number of points to keep
4.   
 
In order to assess whether the order of play affected decisions, we conducted a 
repeated-measures analysis of variance since each subject provided two dependent 
measures: moneykept and pointskept.  The two decisions made by each subject was the 
within-subjects factor in the repeated-measures ANOVA and the order of play was the 
between-subjects factor. 
 
We found that there were no significant order effects.  The test for the between-
subjects effect of order had a calculated F value of F1,45 = 0.012, which was highly non-
significant (attained level of significance p=0.91).  In the test of within-subject contrasts, 
the interaction effect of the order of play and the within-subjects factor was also non-
significant (F1,45 = 1.52, p=0.224), both of which rule out the possibility that order of play 
impacted subjects’ decisions.  
 
Since the repeated-measures ANOVA told us that the order of play was not a 
significant factor, we conducted a t test for a comparison of means on the entire dataset.  
A paired-samples t test was used since the same subject had made decisions both with 
points and with money.  With the sample size of 47, the mean number of points kept by 
the subjects was 7.68 (out of 10) and the mean amount of money kept was $7.66 (out of 
$10).  The calculated value of the t statistic (t46) for the difference between the paired 
means of moneykept vs pointskept was -0.082 with an attained 2-tailed level of 
                                                 
4 We will call this condition “ys” – the y from “money” appearing before the s from “points,” while the 
other condition is referred to as “sy.” 
 
  3significance of 0.935, thereby failing to reject the null hypothesis of no difference.  Thus, 
the two means are not significantly different from each other.   
 
We also conducted separate paired-samples t tests for each “order” group.  The 23 
subjects who played in the “ys” condition kept a mean of 7.87 points for themselves, and 
kept 7.52 dollars for themselves on average.  The difference between the two means was 
not significantly different from zero (t22 = -0.879, p=0.389).  In the “sy” condition, there 
were 24 subjects, with the mean values for points and money being 7.50 and $7.79 
respectively.  Here too, as we would expect from the results of the repeated-measures 
ANOVA, the paired-samples t test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no significant 




4.  Conclusion 
 
All the statistical tests outlined above suggest that there was no significant 
difference in the way student subjects made decisions in dictator games involving a 
decision to split money and points.  In other words, subjects’ decisions with regard to 
class points were no different from the decisions that they made with monetary rewards.  
Although we did this study in the limited context of a simple experimental game, we find 
the results encouraging since they suggest a way to alleviate the monetary burden on 
researchers working in the area of experimental economics.   
 
Some areas of future research merit mention.  First, although this study tells us 
that decisions made with points as rewards are not different from decisions made with 
money as the reward, we do not yet know the “conversion” rate between the two 
currencies.  In other words, we do not know how many points researchers need to give in 
order to motivate a  student to put in the same effort as she would put in for a payment of 
x amount of dollars.  Second, we do not know if grades exhibit the same kind of non-
monotonic relationship as financial incentives do (see for example Gneezy and Rustichini 
2000).  The present study was merely a first step in exploring if there are possibly other 
ways to incentivize students for participation in experimental economics research, and it 
is heartening to note that awarding class points does seem to be a solution. 
 
                                                 
5 Since the underlying distribution may not be normal, we also used the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test to compare the means for our within-subjects design, and got the same results.  The Wilcoxon 
test on the entire sample suggested that the two means were not significantly different (Z = -0.213, p=0.83).  
The means for the ys subgroup and the sy subgroup were also not significantly different (Z = -1.035, p=0.3 
and Z = -0.765, p=0.44 respectively). 
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N  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev 
All cases  47  7.66
 a 1.833 7.68
 a 1.721 
order= ys  23  7.52
 b 1.880 7.87 
b 1.914 
order= sy  24  7.79




a,b,c Means marked with the same letter were compared using a paired-samples t test, and 
are not significantly different from each other. 
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